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Closing the competency loophole: Why Kansas must act before it’s too late
Todd Thompson
Todd Thompson

In Kansas, dangerous criminals can be released from custody before justice is served.

It happened in Colorado. A person was beaten so severely that they suffered permanent brain damage. The assault captured on video. The defendant, charged with attempted murder, was later released, but not because of a lack of evidence, uncooperative witnesses, or a procedural flaw, but because of a loophole in the law.

In Greeley, Colorado, a man charged with attempted murder was found incompetent to stand trial and later released because he did not qualify for involuntary commitment, a legal process through which a person with a severe mental illness can be court-ordered to receive treatment in a hospital or community setting when they are deemed a danger.¹ Two weeks after his release, he was arrested again, this time on a college campus, carrying a firearm.¹

Unfortunately, what happened in Colorado only occurred after new legislation was passed. House Bill 24-1034² was designed to ensure that individuals found incompetent could receive treatment. Yet the bill inadvertently created a dangerous gap in the justice system.¹ The case drew national outrage. Elon Musk shared the story on X (formerly Twitter), calling it “insane,”¹ and right before Charlie Kirk’s murder, he wrote: 

“Colorado judges are choosing to let violent lunatics roam free rather than be locked up like they deserve, and Colorado lawmakers are refusing to close the loopholes that let this happen.”³

Unfortunately, this issue is not unique to Colorado. Kansas has a similar loophole—and it must be fixed.

To understand what has happened, it helps to review the legal background.

In 1960, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a defendant must have both a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and be able to assist in their defense to stand trial—i.e., be competent.⁴ In 1972, the Supreme Court ruled that a person found incompetent cannot be held indefinitely for that reason alone.⁵ If competency cannot be restored within a reasonable period, the state must either civilly commit or release the individual.⁵

Kansas law mirrors these principles. Under K.S.A. 22-3301 et seq., if a defendant is found incompetent, criminal proceedings are suspended, and the person is ordered to undergo treatment aimed at restoring competency. If competency cannot be restored, the person must either be involuntarily committed or released from custody.

Here lies the problem. Under current Kansas law, involuntary commitment is permitted only when the individual poses a “danger to self or others” by a risk of substantial physical injury or abuse to self or others, or substantial property damage, in the foreseeable future, demonstrated by threatening or attempting behavior or a serious inability to provide for basic needs because of the mental disorder, resulting in substantial deterioration in functioning.⁶

That means that a defendant accused of a violent or severe offense who is found incompetent—but not “dangerous” under the statutory definition—must be released, even if the underlying charge demonstrates a clear threat to public safety. Prosecutors across Kansas have faced this situation firsthand.

This must change.

Tennessee faced a similar problem. Jillian Ludwig, a college student, was killed by a stray bullet. Prior to killing Ludwig, the shooter had previously been found incompetent to stand trial and released.⁸ In response, Tennessee enacted “Jillian’s Law,” which ensures that defendants charged with violent offenses cannot be released without meaningful safeguards to protect the public.⁷⁻⁹ 

The law created a rebuttable presumption – or the law already assumes - that such defendants pose a substantial likelihood of serious harm, allowing courts to commit or supervise them even if they do not meet traditional involuntary commitment criteria.⁷ Tennessee also authorized mandatory community-based treatment and added new reporting requirements to improve oversight and coordination.⁷ 

If Tennessee can fix its problem, then Kansas should too.

The Kansas County and District Attorneys Association has already made this issue a top legislative priority, and many lawmakers and elected officials like myself have expressed support.

The proposed reforms would amend Kansas’ involuntary commitment and competency statutes.

The proposal would ensure that individuals charged with the most serious crimes, including charges like murder, rape, and similar offenses, can be committed even if they do not meet the traditional “danger to self or others” standard, while excluding non-homicide and non-sex offenses from this override.¹¹

The changes would also allow prosecutors to take a more active role by challenging a Chief Medical Officer’s recommendation for release and presenting evidence of dangerousness or probable cause during hearings. In addition, the reforms would authorize show-cause or evidentiary hearings, (similar to grand jury proceedings), to establish a factual basis for charges when no preliminary hearing occurred before the finding of incompetency.

For high-severity crimes, the statutes would permit alternative or continued institutionalization, akin to post-acquittal commitment following a “not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect” determination.

Finally, the reforms would recognize that the presence of an organic brain disease or similar condition could independently justify commitment, even in the absence of immediate dangerousness.

These reforms would enhance public safety, protect due process, and ensure that defendants accused of the most serious crimes do not fall through procedural cracks due to incompetency findings.

The last thing any community wants is to have a dangerous individual back on the streets only to see another preventable tragedy occur. Colorado and Tennessee serve as powerful warnings of what happens when well-intentioned laws fail to anticipate real-world consequences.

Kansas now has the opportunity to act before tragedy strikes again. We must urge Kansas legislators to close this loophole. If you share this concern, contact your legislator, the Governor’s Office, or me. The dangerous loophole must be closed. Public safety and justice depend on it.

 

Todd Thompson is the Leavenworth County Attorney. Contact him at countyattorney@leavenworthcounty.gov. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Leavenworth County Attorney’s Office, the Kansas County and District Attorneys Association, or any other governmental entity.

This article is provided for general informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Reading this article does not create an attorney-client relationship with the author or any affiliated office. Individuals with specific legal questions should consult a licensed attorney in their jurisdiction.


Bibliography

1. Shelly Bradbury, Denver Post, “What role did a 2024 Colorado law play in the release of Ephraim Debisa from Weld County’s jail?” (Sept. 27, 2025), link.

2. Colo. H.B. 24-1034, 74th Gen. Assemb. (2024).

3. Charlie Kirk (@charliekirk11), X (formerly Twitter), Sept. 9, 2025.

4. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).

5. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).

6. Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-3301 to -3303 (2024); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-2946 et seq. (2024).

7. Tenn. H.B. 1640, 113th Gen. Assemb., Pub. Ch. 784 (2024); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 33-7-301, -401 (2024) (“Jillian’s Law”).

8. Associated Press, “Tennessee Lawmakers Pass Bill to Involuntarily Commit Some Defendants Judged Incompetent for Trial” (Apr. 2024).

9. WSMV-TV, “Bill Filed to Keep Defendants Found Incompetent to Stand Trial from Reoffending” (Jan. 5, 2024).

10. Kansas Judicial Council, Report on Commitment of Incompetent Defendants (2019).

11. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4704 (2024) (Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, defining severity levels 1–3 offenses).